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1 Introduction
We compare arguably the most popular selling rules xed pricing, rst price and second price
auctions in a competitive setting where some customers are budget constrained. The adoption of
a selling rule is a strategic decision in that it signals how the seller intends to share the surplus,
which in turn inuences the attractiveness of the store and pins down the expected demand. The
selection becomes more interesting if potential customers have limited budgets. Indeed sellers often
face customers who are willing to pay but have limited immediate nancial resources to do so.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that markets for houses, automobiles and other expensive durable
goods (appliances, electronic equipment, furniture, business equipment, etc.) often exhibit this
trait. Despite its practical importance, little attention has been paid to the relationship between
buyerslimited purchasing power and the trading mechanism in place. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the rst attempt investigating trade mechanism selection in a competitive setting with
budget constrained buyers.1
1We contribute to a segment of the directed search literature that studies trading mechanism selection in a compet-
itive environment where the demand at a store endogenously depends on the trading mechanism in place; see, Kultti
1
A rst result is the payo¤equivalence of rst and second price auctions. We show that, controlling
for the expected demand and reserve price, both auction formats yield identical payo¤s. Financially
constrained buyers (low types) bid their budgets b under both formats and they have no chance
of winning if a high budget type is present in the auction. High types, on the other hand, bid
aggressively under second price auctions but shade their bids somewhat under rst price auctions.
In expected terms, however, they earn the same. Absent budget constraints, payo¤ equivalence is
well established in the auction literature. With budget constrained bidders Che and Gale (1996)
prove a similar result when the budget distribution is continuous; we show that the result holds with
a discrete distribution as well. Payo¤ equivalence implies that in a competitive setting, sellers and
buyers are indi¤erent to adopting or joining either auction format.
We fully characterize possible equilibria and show that the choice between xed pricing and
auctions depends on the size of b: if it is large then sellers pick xed pricing, if it is small then
they pick auctions and if it is moderate then both mechanisms coexist. To understand this result
one needs to rst look at the outcome with no budget constraints. In a setting with homogenous,
nancially unconstrained buyers, xed pricing and auctions are payo¤-equivalent and coexist in the
same market (Kultti, 1999; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010). Competition among sellers dictates that,
irrespective of the mechanism they compete with, sellers must provide each customer with the same
level of "market utility", which is endogenous and commensurate with the degree of competition in
the market. Both xed pricing as well as auctions are capable of doing this; as such they coexist.2
The introduction of low budget buyers into the homogenous model breaks the payo¤ equivalence
between xed pricing and auctions. With xed pricing the fact that some buyers have lower budgets
is immaterial so long as they can a¤ord the equilibrium price in the homogenous model. This means
that if b is high enough then the budget constraint is slack and xed pricing is still capable of
allocating all buyers the same market utility. With auctions, however, the budget constraint is never
slack. Indeed, under both auction formats, no matter how large b is, low budget types have no
chance of winning if a high budget type is present in the auction. Consequently, low types end up
with a smaller market utility than high types (despite the fact that they have the same willingness
to pay). This inequality is not compatible with prot maximization under competition and explains
why sellers compete with xed pricing, and not with auctions, when b is large.
If b falls below a threshold then, even with xed pricing, the budget constraint starts to bind. In
this region, serving customers indiscriminately is no longer feasible as low types are unable to a¤ord
the equilibrium posted price. So, sellers start to prioritize high types over low types by adopting
auctions. The fraction of sellers switching to auctions rises as b decreases and if b falls below another
(1999), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), Virag (2011) Geromichalos (2012), Selcuk (2012). We di¤er from these studies
by considering budget constrained buyers. There are number of papers in the auction literature focusing on budget
constrained bidders e.g. see Che and Gale (1998), Zheng (2001), Hafalir et al. (2012), Burkett (2015) and Kotowski
(2015). These setups do not consider competition or the possibility of selling via a di¤erent rule. An exception is
Che and Gale (2000) who study the optimal selling mechanism to budget-constrained buyers; however they consider
a single seller rather than a competitive market.
2The result is in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) is more general in that they show that payo¤ equivalence and
coexistence is not restricted to xed pricing or auctions, rather it holds for a range of mechanisms they label as
"payo¤-complete".
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threshold then all sellers compete with auctions. Auction sellers use the reserve price as partial
protection against the presence of low types. Indeed, the equilibrium reserve price rises if the budget
decreases or if the percentage of the low types increases.
Sellers have the ability to screen out low types ex-ante by posting una¤ordable prices; however, in
equilibrium no seller employs such a tactic. The auction mechanism is already capable of screening
customers ex-post as it makes sure that it is a high type who wins (and pays for) the item. Since
this tool is available, screening customers ex-ante, i.e. point-blank refusing to deal with low types,
is suboptimal.
We extend the model by letting sellers to ask for an entry fee. With entry fees the nature of the
equilibria remains the same but the thresholds are smaller than before; hence the budget constraint
is less binding. Indeed, entry fees allow sellers to collect the revenue from all buyers present at the
store not just from the one who purchases the item as such they shrink the parameter space in
which the budget constraint kicks in.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy populated by a large number of risk-neutral buyers and sellers, where the
aggregate buyer-seller ratio is : Each seller is endowed with one unit of a good and wants to sell it
above his reservation price, zero. Similarly each buyer wants to purchase one unit of an indivisible
good and is willing to pay up to his reservation price, one. Buyers are identical in terms of their
valuation of the good but they di¤er in terms of their ability to pay. A fraction  of buyers (low
types) have limited budgets and can pay up to b < 1 whereas the rest (high types) can pay up to 1.
A buyers type is private information; however, the parameters ;  and b are common knowledge.
The game proceeds over the course of three stages. Here we give a brief overview and ll in the
details later. In the rst stage sellers simultaneously and independently choose a trading mechanism
m 2M and a list price (reserve price in case of auctions) rm 2 [0; 1] : The set of trading mechanisms
M consists of xed pricing, rst price auctions and second price auctions. With xed pricing the
transaction necessarily occurs at the list price rf : With auctions the reserve price is charged if a
single customer is present at the store and bidding ensues if there are multiple customers.
In the second stage buyers observe sellersselections and choose one store to visit; however once
they reach a store they cannot move elsewhere. If the customer is alone at the store then he pays
the reserve/list price and obtains the good for sure. If there are n > 1 buyers then with xed pricing
each buyer has an equal chance 1=n of obtaining the item. With auctions, however, bidding ensues
and the winner as well as the sale price are determined based on the specics of each auction format
(more on this below). If trade takes place at price r then the seller realizes payo¤ r, the buyer
realizes 1  r whereas those who do not trade earn zero.
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2.2 Demand Distribution
Following the directed search literature, we restrict attention to mixed visiting strategies that are
symmetric and anonymous on and o¤ the equilibrium path (Burdett et al., 2001; Shimer, 2005).
Symmetry requires buyers of the same type to use the same visiting strategies, whereas anonymity
means that sellers posting the same "package" (m; rm) should be treated identically. Symmetry
and anonymity in buyersvisiting strategies imply that the distribution of demand at any store is
Poisson (Galenianos and Kircher, 2012). Hence, the probability that a seller with the terms (m; rm)
meets n = 0; 1; 2::: customers of type i = h; l is given by zn (xi;m) where
zn (x) =
e xxn
n!
. (1)
We refer to xi;m as the expected demand consisting of type i buyers. Since high types and low
types arrive at independent Poisson rates xh;m and xl;m; the distribution of the total demand is
also Poisson with xh;m + xl;m (Grimmett and Welsh, 1986). Expected demands xh;m and xl;m are
endogenous and depend on the price package (m; rm) and how it compares with the rest of the
market (see below).3
Let ui;m (n) denote the conditional expected utility of a type i buyer at a store that trades via
rule m and has n customers, including the buyer himself. Similarly let m (n) denote a stores
conditional expected prot (conditional on trading via rule m and having n customers). Below we
pin down these payo¤s for all mechanisms, starting with auctions.
2.3 Auctions
Under both auction formats if there is a single customer at the store, i.e. if n = 1; then the reserve
price is charged but if n  2 then bidding ensues. The outcome of the bidding process depends
on the auction format as well as how many high types and how many low types are present in the
auction. We know that low types and high types arrive at rates xl;m and xh;m (for now we drop the
mechanism subscript m when understood). A buyers type is his private information, so neither the
seller nor the other buyers know whether a particular buyer is a high type or a low type, but they
can work out this probability from the arrival rates. Specically, given that are n customers present
in the auction, the probability that exactly j of them are low types is equal to
Pr(j low types & n  j high types)
Pr(n customers)
=
zj (xl) zn j (xh)
zn (xl + xh)
=

n
j

j (1  )n j ;
where
 =
xl
xh + xl
:
In words, the distribution of types is binomial (n; ), where  is the probability that a customer is
a low type: The bidding strategies will depend on this probability. Note that  is endogenous and
3Throughout the text, we refer to xi;m as "expected demand", "arrival rate" or "queue length", even though we
realize that there are nuances across these terms.
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it depends on the arrival rates xh and xl, which are also endogenous and they depend on what the
seller posts and how it compares with the rest of the market. For instance, a change in the reserve
price a¤ects how many and what type of customers the seller gets, which, in turn, a¤ects  and
thereby the outcome of the bidding process. So, market competition lters into the bidding process
via the parameter .
2.3.1 Second Price Auctions
Consider a second price auction, where the winner pays the second highest bid. To prevent buyers
from bidding above their budgets we assume that a bid must be accompanied by a deposit of equal
value. If the bidder wins, then he gets back the di¤erence between the deposit and the sale price.
Otherwise he gets back the entire deposit. Given that low types cannot overbid, it is straightforward
to verify that in the unique pure strategy equilibrium low types bid b and high types bid 1. Therefore
equilibrium payo¤s are
uh (n) = 
n 1 (1  b) and ul (n) = 
n 1
n
(1  b) for n  2: (2)
Note that uh > ul because a low type has no chance of winning if there is a high type present in
the auction, no matter how small the budget di¤erence is. Given the bidding strategies, the sellers
expected prot is given by
 (n) =

n + nn 1 (1  ) b+ 1  n   nn 1 (1  ) for n  2: (3)
The expression in square brackets is the probability of having n low types and zero high types or
having n  1 low types and one high type. In either case the winning bid is b: The remainder of the
expression is the probability of having two or more high types, in which case the winning bid is 1.
The expressions above encompass corner scenarios where one type may be absent from bidding.
To see why, suppose that low types stay away from the auction, i.e. suppose xl = 0: Then  = 0
and therefore uh (n) = 0 and  (n) = 1: Indeed, if all bidders are high types then they all bid 1, the
seller earns 1 and all buyers earn 0. Similarly if high types stay away, i.e. if xh = 0, then  = 1
and therefore ul (n) = 1 bn and  (n) = b: Indeed, if all bidders are low types then they all bid b; the
seller earns b and, due to the tie, each buyer has an equal chance 1=n of winning the item.
2.3.2 First Price Auctions
With rst price auctions the winner pays his own bid rather than the second highest bid.4 It is
easy to verify that the game does not have a pure strategy equilibrium. In what follows we focus
on a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where players of the same type purse the same bidding
strategies.
4Overbidding can be ruled out either by requiring a cash bond or, alternatively, by not giving the item to the
bidder who reneges on his bid and by imposing a (small) penalty on him. The fact that the winner pays his own bid
eliminates the appeal of overbidding.
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Proposition 1 Consider a rst price auction where some buyers have limited budgets. In the unique
symmetric equilibrium low types bid b whereas high types continuously randomize in the interval
b; 1  n 1 (1  b) according to cdf
Gh (p) =

1  
"
1  b
1  p
 1
n 1
  1
#
:
Equilibrium payo¤s are given by
uh (n) = 
n 1 (1  b) and ul (n) = 
n 1
n
(1  b) for n  2: (4)
Comparing (2) and (4), it is clear that, from a buyers perspective, both auction formats are
payo¤ equivalent and deliver the same expected utilities. Low types, under both formats, bid their
budget b: High types, on the other hand, bid less aggressively with the rst price auction than they
do in the second price auction; however, in expected terms, they end up earning the same. Note
that high types are sure to bid more than b; hence, low types have no chance of winning if a high
type is present in the auction:
The equivalence of buyerspayo¤s implies that, from a sellers point of view, both auction formats
are revenue equivalent because no surplus is left on the table. In the rest of this section we will
formally prove this claim. To start, let P (j;n) denote the expected value of the winning bid in a
rst price auction when there n buyers present in the auction and j of them are high types. If j = 0
then all buyers are low types and the winning bid is b i.e. P (0;n) = b: If j  1 then the winner will
be a high type as they outbid low types for sure, however the distribution of the winning bid needs
to be determined. Recall that each high type randomizes in

b; 1  n 1 (1  b) according to cdf
Gh: So, each bid is an independent random variable drawn from the same interval via the same cdf
and the winning bid is the maximum of these j bids. It follows that the winning bid is distributed in
the same interval but according to the cdf Gjh (Grimmett and Welsh, 1986). Given the distribution,
the expected value of the winning bid is given by
P (j;n) =
Z pn
b
pdGjh (p) = pG
j
h (p)
pn
b
 
Z pn
b
Gjh (p) dp;
where pn  1  n 1 (1  b) : In the second step we used integration by parts. Since Gh (pn) = 1 and
Gh (b) = 0 we have
P (j;n) = pn  
Z pn
b
Gjh (p) dp:
The expected payo¤ of the seller is given by
 (n) = nb+
nX
j=1

n
j

n j (1  )j P (j;n) :
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With probability n all buyers are low types, so the winning bid is b:With probability
 
n
j

n j (1  )j
there are j  1 high types and n  j low types present in the auction, in which case the winner is a
high type and the expected winning bid is P (j;n) : Substituting for P (j;n) yields
 (n) = nb+ pn
nX
j=1

n
j

n j (1  )j  
Z pn
b
nX
j=1

n
j

n j (1  )j Gjh (p) dp:
After applying the binomial theorem to the expressions with summations we have
 (n) = nb+ pn(1  n) 
Z pn
b
f[ + (1  )Gh (p)]n   ngdp:
Substituting for Gh (p) and evaluating the integral yields
 (n) = pn   n (n  1) (1  b)
n
n 1 (1  p)  1n 1
pn
b
:
Substituting for pn and re-arranging we have
 (n) =

n + nn 1(1  ) b+ 1  n   nn 1(1  ) for n  2: (5)
Comparing (3) and (5) term by term reveals that, ceteris paribus, both auction formats raise the
same expected revenue for the seller. Revenue equivalence between xed and second price auctions
is well known in the literature. Here we show that it remains valid with nancially constrained
bidders. Che and Gale (1996) prove a similar result when the budget distribution is continuous. We
show that it holds with a discrete distribution as well.
The discussion so far establishes that, controlling for the expected demand and the reserve price,
both auction formats are payo¤ equivalent, which means that in a competitive setting sellers and
buyers are indi¤erent to adopting or joining either auction format. So from now on we make no
distinction between rst price or second price auctions, and use the generic term "auctions" instead.
2.4 Buyers
A type i buyers expected utility from visiting a store competing with mechanism m is given by
Ui;m (rm; xh;m; xl;m) =
1X
n=0
zn (xh;m + xl;m)ui;m (n+ 1) : (6)
Note that Ui;m is a weighted sum of all conditional utilities ui;m: With probability zn () the buyer
nds n = 0; 1; :: other customers at the same store; so, in total there are n+ 1 customers (including
himself) and the conditional expected utility corresponding to this scenario is ui;m (n+ 1) :
Start with auctions (denoted with subscript a) and for now suppose that the reserve price is
a¤ordable i.e. ra  b: If a buyer is alone at an auction store then he obtains the item by paying the
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reserve price i.e. uh;a (1) = ul;a (1) = 1  ra: If n  2 then we know that under both auction formats
uh;a (n) = 
n 1 (1  b) and ul;a (n) = 
n 1
n
(1  b) ; where  = xl;a
xh;a + xl;a
:
Substituting these expressions into (6) yields
Uh;a = z0 (xh;a + xl;a) (1  ra) +
1X
n=1
zn (xh;a + xl;a) 
n (1  b) and
Ul;a = z0 (xh;a + xl;a) (1  ra) +
1X
n=1
zn (xh;a + xl;a)
n
n+ 1
(1  b) :
After substituting for  and re-arranging we have
Uh;a = z0 (xh;a + xl;a) (1  ra) + z0 (xh;a) (1  z0 (xl;a)) (1  b) and (7)
Ul;a = z0 (xh;a + xl;a) (1  ra) + z0 (xh;a) 1  z0 (xl;a)  z1 (xl;a)
xl;a
(1  b) : (8)
Observe that if b < 1 then Uh;a > Ul;a i.e. at an auction store, a low type obtains a strictly lower
expected utility than a high type. The reason is that under both auction formats low types are
always second to high types at the point of service; they have no chance of winning the item if a
high type is present in the auction. This is true no matter how large b is. At xed price stores things
are di¤erent. Assuming rf  b we have
uh;f (n) = ul;f (n) =
1  rf
n
for all n  1:
Substituting this into (6) yields
Uh;f = Ul;f =
1X
n=0
zn (xh;f + xl;f )
1  rf
n+ 1
=
1  z0(xh;f + xl;f )
xh;f + xl;f
(1  rf ): (9)
In a xed price store both types earn the same expected utility because xed pricing is egalitarian
at the point of service. The mechanism does not screen out customers ex-post (i.e. at the point of
transaction): If the list price is a¤ordable then all customers have the same chance 1=n of acquiring
the good. The auction mechanism, on the other hand, screens out customers ex-post by prioritizing
who obtains the good according to their budgets.
In addition to ex-post screening, the list/reserve price may be used as an ex-ante screening device
to prevent low types from shopping at a particular store. A seller who wishes to trade with high
types only can do so by advertising a price above b.5 If this is the case, then high type buyers
5We assume that sellers can use cash bonds or nancial disclosure requirements to implement ex-ante screening.
Buyers pay up-front a sum equal to the reserve price to a third party. In case the buyer obtains the good, the deposit
is transferred to the seller; otherwise it is returned to its owner at no cost. Such a practice prevents low types from
showing up at una¤ordable stores. A nancial disclosure requirement is also e¤ective.
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expected utilities at such stores can be obtained by plugging xl;a = 0 into (7) or xl;f = 0 into (9).
Lemma 1 Assuming rm  b we have @Ui;m@rm < 0;
@Ui;m
@xh;m
< 0 and @Ui;m@xl;m < 0 for m = a; f and i = h; l:
If rm > b then, again,
@Uh;m
@rm
and @Uh;m@xh;m are both negative.
The Lemma says that buyers dislike expensive and crowded stores. The signs of the partial
derivatives wrt rm are obvious. For the ones wrt xh;m and xl;m note that a larger xh;m or xl;m
shifts the probability mass from small to large demand realizations. Such a shift causes the expected
utility to decline because customer are less likely to be served at stores with a large demand. For a
formal proof see Camera and Selcuk (2009).
Let 
i denote the maximum expected utility ("market utility") a type i customer can obtain in
the entire market.6 For now we treat 
i as given, subsequently it will be determined endogenously.
Consider an individual seller who advertises (m; rm) and suppose that high and low type buyers
respond to this advertisement with arrival rates xh;m  0 and xl;m  0: These rates satisfy
xi;m
(
> 0 if Ui;m (rm; xh;m; xl;m) = 
i
= 0 if Ui;m (rm; xh;m; xl;m) < 
i
: (10)
In words, the tuple (rm; xh;m; xl;m) must generate an expected utility of at least 
h for high type
customers, else they will stay away (xh;m = 0) and at least 
l for low type customers, else they will
stay away (xl;m = 0): The indi¤erence condition holds on and o¤ the equilibrium path, i.e. if a seller
posts something no one else posts, his queue lengths are still determined by (10). Notice, however,

i is not a¤ected by unilateral deviations. The reason is that in a large economy the covariance of
demand across stores vanishes; hence a change in the probability of visiting a particular store does
not a¤ect the distribution of demand at other stores. Peters (2000) provides micro-foundations of
this argument.
Note that by denition 
i  Ui;m: Furthermore, recall that Uh;a > Ul;a and Uh;f = Ul;f ; thus

h  
l. The indi¤erence condition reveals a "law of demand" in that the expected demand xi;m
decreases as the price rm increases. In words, cheaper stores attract more customers and expensive
stores attract fewer customers. To see why, note that Ui;m (rm; xh;m; xl;m) = 
i implies
dxi;m
drm
=   @Ui;m=@rm
@Ui;m=@xi;m
< 0:
The numerator and the denominator are both negative (Lemma 1); hence dxi;m=drm is negative,
indicating that if the seller raises r then buyers respond by decreasing x. From a sellers point of
view, raising the price brings in more revenue; however it lowers the expected demand. The sellers
problem involves nding a balance between these two opposing e¤ects, which we study next.
6The market utility approach greatly facilitates the characterization of equilibrium and, therefore, is standard in
the directed search literature. For an extended discussion see Galenianos and Kircher (2012).
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2.5 Sellers
Consider a seller who competes with mechanism m: His expected prot is given by
m (rm; xh;m; xl;m) =
1X
n=1
zn (xh;m + xl;m)m (n) :
Clearly m is a weighted sum of conditional payo¤s m: with probability zn () the seller gets n
customers and the corresponding payo¤ associated with this scenario is m (n) : Again, start with
auctions. If a single customer is present then the reserve price is charged, i.e. a (1) = ra: If n  2
then both auction formats yield the same a (n), given by (5); hence
a = z1 (xh;a + xl;a) ra +
1X
n=2
zn (xh;a + xl;a) f[n + nn 1 (1  )]b+ 1  n   nn 1 (1  )g:
After substituting for zn and  and simplifying we have
a = z1 (xh;a + xl;a) ra + 1  z0 (xh;a)  z1 (xh;a)
+bfz0 (xh;a) + z1 (xh;a)  z0 (xh;a + xl;a)  z1 (xh;a + xl;a)g:
(11)
If the seller sets ra > b; then his expected prot can be found by substituting xl;a = 0 into the
expression above. The expected prot of a xed price seller is easier to calculate. We have
f (n) = rf for n  1
hence
f =
1X
n=1
zn (xh;f + xl;f ) rf = f1  z0(xh;f + xl;f )grf : (12)
The expression inside the curly brackets is the probability of getting at least one customer, high type
or low type. In either case the seller charges the posted price rf : Again if rf > b; then his expected
prot is obtained by letting xl;f = 0: The equation below reveals the connection between a sellers
expected prot and his customersexpected utilities.
Lemma 2 The following relationship holds both for auctions as well as for xed pricing:
m = 1  z0 (xh;m + xl;m)  xh;mUh;m   xl;mUl;m; where m = a; f: (13)
The expression 1 z0 (xh;m + xl;m) can be interpreted as the expected revenue. It is the value created
by a sale (one), multiplied by the probability of trading. One can interpret xh;mUh;m + xl;mUl;m as
the expected cost. The seller promises a payo¤ Uh;m to each high type and Ul;m to each low type
customer. On average he gets xh;m high type and xl:m low type customers; so the total cost equals
to xh;mUh;m + xl;mUl;m. The prot m is simply the di¤erence between the revenue and the cost.
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Each seller chooses a mechanism m 2 M and a price rm 2 [0; 1] but realizes that expected
demands xh;m and xl;m are determined via (10). So, a sellers problem is
max
m2M; rm2[0;1]; (xh;m;xl;m)2R2+
m (rm; xh;m; xl;m) subject to (10) (14)
Indi¤erence conditions in (10) determine expected demands xh;m and xl;m as functions of the pricing
rule m and the price rm. Note that the seller faces two constraints one for high type customers and
one for low type customers one of which must hold with equality. If both constraints bind, then
the seller is able to attract both types of customers. If a single constraint binds then he attracts one
type only. (The case where neither constraint binds, of course, is ruled out as it implies that the
seller does not get any customer at all).
To close down the model, we need a feasibility condition to ensure that the weighted sum of
expected demands across all sellers equals to the aggregate buyer-seller ratio. Sellers are free to pick
between xed pricing and auctions and similarly they are free to post any list/reserve price within
the interval [0; 1]. So let m denote the fraction of sellers opting for rule m 2 M and let 'm (rm)
denote the fraction of sellers, among the ones who adopted rule m; posting rm 2 [0; 1]. Recall that
 is the aggregate buyer-seller ratio and that  is the fraction of low type buyers. Letting l  
and h  (1  ) we have
X
m2M
m
Z 1
0
'm(rm)xi;m(rm)drm = i for i = h; l: (15)
Note that there are two conditions in (15), one for high types and one for low types.
3 Results
For reference, we record the outcome with no nancial constraints.
Remark 1 Suppose b = 1 i.e. suppose that buyers are homogenous. There exists a continuum of
payo¤ equivalent equilibria where both mechanisms coexist. In any given equilibrium the expected
demand at a store is  and sellers earn
 () = 1  z0 ()  z1 () (16)
no matter which rule they compete with whereas buyers earn z0 () no matter which sellers rule they
join in. Sellers competing with xed pricing post rf =  () ; where
 () =
 ()
1  z0 () ; (17)
whereas the ones competing with auctions post ra = 0:
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For a formal proof see Eeckhout and Kircher (2010). Competition among sellers dictates that,
irrespective of the mechanism a seller competes with, he must provide all customers with the same
market utility, z0 (), which is commensurate with the degree of competition in the market.7 Any
mechanism that is capable of such a surplus allocation may be adopted in equilibrium. Eeckhout
and Kircher (2010) show that payo¤ equivalence and coexistence is not restricted to xed pricing or
auctions, rather it holds for a range of mechanisms they label as "payo¤-complete". In an earlier
paper Kultti (1999) proves a similar result for xed pricing and second price auctions.
3.1 Outcomes when M = fxed pricingg and M = fauctionsg
For a moment ignore auctions. Below we characterize possible outcomes when sellers compete via
xed pricing only.
Proposition 2 Suppose M = fxed pricingg. If b   () then the budget constraint is slack. All
sellers advertise  () and serve both types of customers indiscriminately. If (h) < b < f ()
then a fraction of stores ("a¤ordable stores") post b and serve low types, whereas remaining stores
("expensive stores") post above b and serve high types: High types avoid a¤ordable stores as they are
too crowded. Finally, if b  (h) then low types are screened out completely: all sellers advertise
(h) > b and serve high types only. Each outcome described above is the unique equilibrium within
its parameter region.
Recall that  () is the equilibrium xed price in the homogenous model. If b   () then this price
is a¤ordable even to low types; hence the budget constraint is slack and the xed price equilibrium
with homogenous buyers remains intact. In the other extreme where b is severely low, sellers ignore
low types altogether and target high types only. Doing so e¤ectively reduces the buyer-seller ratio
to h; and per Remark 1, in such an outcome sellers earn (h). If b  (h) then no seller would
deviate from this outcome by catering to low types, because doing so can at most bring in a revenue
b which is less than (h) anyway.
If b is moderate, i.e. if it is neither large enough to slacken the budget constraint nor small
enough to justify ignoring low types altogether, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium
where some stores are expensive and cater to high types while others are a¤ordable and cater to
low types. A¤ordable stores are too crowded and possess too much trade risk the risk of not being
able to purchase hence high types avoid shopping at such stores. Instead they shop at expensive
stores where the price is high but customers can relatively rest assured of being able to purchase.
Now, we turn to auctions.
Lemma 3 If M = fauctionsg then each seller must set ra  b and cater to both types of customers.
The Lemma says that with auctions, unlike with xed pricing, low types are never screened out
ex-ante; neither partially nor completely. This is true no matter how small the budget is or how
7The buyer-seller ratio , inversely, proxies the degree of market competition: the lower this ratio, the more compet-
itive (from a sellers point of view) the market. Note that z0 () rises if  falls, i.e. if the market is highly competitive
then buyers expect to be rewarded with a high level of utility.
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few low types are. The intuition is this. Practicing ex-ante screening (i.e. setting a reserve price
above b) and catering exclusively to high types is viable only if doing so has some distinct appeal for
high budget shoppers. With xed pricing there is such an appeal: expensive stores are less crowded
so they o¤er a much better prospect of buying the item. With auctions, though, this advantage
disappears. In a bidding contest high types are not deterred by the presence of low types; they
can outbid them (no matter how many low types may be present in the contest). So, from such a
customers point of view, whether or not an auction store is una¤ordable to low types is immaterial,
which is why no seller sets ra > b.
Proposition 3 If M = fauctionsg then there exists a unique equilibrium where all sellers set the
same reserve price ra = minfb; r^ (l)g; where r^ is given by (23). The expected demand at each store
equals to h + l = :
The equilibrium reserve price ra is either interior or corner depending on the severity of the budget
constraint. If b is su¢ ciently large then r^ < b, so we have the interior solution where ra = r^: Else
we have the corner solution where ra = b. One can verify that dr^=db < 0 and dr^=dl > 0; i.e. the
worse the budget constraint (low b and/or high l) the higher the reserve price: In words, sellers
o¤set the shortfall in prots caused by budget constraints through raising the reserve price. Observe
that if b = 1 then r^ = 0, which indeed corresponds to the equilibrium reserve price in a model with
homogenous buyers (see Remark 1; see also Julien et al. (2000)). However, as soon as b falls below 1;
the reserve price starts to grow beyond zero. The implication is that with auctions, unlike with xed
pricing, the budget constraint is never slack; as long as b is below 1 the outcome with homogenous
customers ceases to exist.
3.2 Fixed Pricing or Auctions?
We now turn to the full-edged model where sellers are free to choose between xed pricing and
auctions.
Lemma 4 If M = fxed pricing, auctionsg then auction stores set the same reserve price ra =
minfr^(xl;a); bg and cater to both types of customers. Fixed price stores, on the other hand, advertise
rf = minf(xh;f + xl;f ); bg:
The lemma does not prove if an auction equilibrium or a xed price equilibrium exists; however it
claries what list/reserve price sellers would post and what type of customers they would get if such
equilibria were to exist. Furthermore, it establishes a symmetry result by showing that sellers trading
with the same rule will post the same price. These results greatly facilitate the characterization of
the equilibria.
Note that both ra and rf ought to be less than or equal to b. Recall that if M = fxed pricingg
then sellers would post rf > b and screen out low types if b was severely low. However, ifM = fxed
pricing, auctionsg then this is no longer the case. Indeed, the auction mechanism is already capable
of screening customers ex-post and making sure that a high type wins the item. Since this tool is
available, refusing to deal with low types up-front is suboptimal.
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Proposition 4 Suppose M = fxed pricing, auctionsg: If b is su¢ ciently large then an equilibrium
where all sellers compete with auctions, fails to exist.
In an auction equilibrium with nancially constrained buyers the market utilities are such that

h > z0 () > 
l;
whereas in a homogenous setting with nancially unconstrained buyers the market utilities satisfy

h = 
l = z0 () :
Absent budget constraints, competition among sellers dictates that both types of buyers, who have
the same willingness to pay, ought to earn the same market utility z0 () : This allocation cannot be
achieved via auctions because the auction mechanism prioritizes high types over low types even when
b = 1  ": This is why in an auction equilibrium high typesmarket utility 
h exceeds z0 () ; which
in turn exceeds low typesmarket utility 
l. This inequality presents an opportunity to deviate to
xed pricing and attract a disproportionate number of low types. We show that such a deviation is
feasible if low types have su¢ ciently large budgets.
In a similar setting, but with no budget constraints, McAfee (1993) shows that the unique
equilibrium entails all sellers holding second price auctions with a suitable reserve price and buy-
ers randomizing across stores. We show that this result is not robust to the presence of budget
constrained buyers; indeed, merely lowering the budgets of a few buyers is enough to invalidate
an (unconstrained) auction equilibrium.8 Results pertaining payo¤ equivalence in Eeckhout and
Kircher (2010) and Kultti (1999) disappear similarly in the face of budget constraints. We can now
state the main result of the paper.
Proposition 5 Suppose M = fxed pricing, auctionsg. There are three possible outcomes taking
place in mutually exclusive parameter regions:
1. If b   () then all stores adopt xed pricing and post the same list price rf =  (). The expected
demand at each store is h + l = .
2. If b# < b <  (), where the threshold b# > 0 is dened in the Appendix, xed pricing and
auctions coexist. Fixed price stores advertise rf = b and serve low types only. Auction stores set
ra = minfb; r^(xl;a)g and serve both types of customers. High types avoid xed price stores as they
are too crowded, specically xh;f = 0 while x

l;f >  > x

l;a + x

h;a:
3. If b  b# then all stores adopt auctions and set the same reserve price ra = minfb; r^(l)g: Each
seller expects to get h + l =  customers.
8The setup in McAfee (1993) has buyers who di¤er in their valuations. In our model, however, buyers have identical
valuations; so to verify that our result is not a knife-edge case, we have carried out the following robustness check
(available upon request). Suppose that a fraction of customers have valuation v < 1 and that some of the high value
customers have low budgets: If buyers are su¢ ciently similar in terms of their valuations and budgets, then, again, an
auction equilibrium fails to exist.
14
If b   () then the budget constraint is slack and the xed price equilibrium with homogenous
buyers remains intact. Despite the presence of low budget types, sellers are still capable of providing
all buyers the same market utility by adopting xed pricing. In this parameter region auctions
are competed away because, as mentioned above, the auction mechanism rewards buyers with dif-
ferent market utilities, which is not compatible with prot maximization in the absence of budget
constraints (the budget constraint can be avoided via xed pricing).
If, however, b falls below  () then the budget constraint starts to bind. In this region, serving
customers indiscriminately (via xed pricing) is no longer feasible as low types are unable to a¤ord
the equilibrium list price. So, sellers start to prioritize high types over low types by switching
to auctions. The fraction of sellers adopting auctions rises as b decreases and if b falls below the
threshold b# then all sellers compete with auctions (The threshold b# is the unique value of b
satisfying equation (25) in the Appendix). See Figure 1a for an illustration.
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3.3 Constrained E¢ ciency
Consider a social planner whose objective is to maximize the total surplus while still being con-
strained with the same matching frictions in the decentralized economy (hence "constrained e¢ -
ciency"). The planner can assign seller k with terms of trade (m; rkm) 2M [0; 1] and queue lengths
(xkh; x
k
l ) 2 R2 taking as given the demand distribution in (1). Recall that buyers are identical in
their valuation of the good. If trade occurs at price r  b the seller obtains payo¤ r while the buyer,
no matter his type, obtains payo¤ 1   r; hence the total surplus at every meeting equals to 1. It
follows that a su¢ cient condition to ensure that every meeting results in trade is not letting sellers to
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engage in ex-ante screening i.e. by keeping rkm below b.
9 Constrained e¢ ciency is, then, equivalent
to maximizing the total number of trades in the market. This is achieved by assigning each seller
with the same total demand . To see why suppose, with some abuse of notation, that the measure
of sellers is 1 and that the planner divides them into S equal groups assigning group k with queue
lengths xkh and x
k
l : The planner solves
max
(xkh;x
k
l )2R2
SX
k=1
1  z0(xkh + xkl )
S
s.t.
SX
k=1
xkh
S
= h and
SX
k=1
xkl
S
= l:
It is easy to show that the solution entails setting xkh + x
k
l =  for all k; i.e. an outcome is e¢ cient
if each store receives the same expected demand .
Remark 2 The no-screening (xed price) and the full-screening (auction) equilibria described in
Proposition (5) are both constrained e¢ cient since in either case each store receives the same expected
demand . The partial screening equilibrium where both rules coexist, on the other hand, is ine¢ cient
as xed price stores are too crowded whereas auction stores are too depleted (compared to the e¢ cient
level ).
Interestingly, if b is too large or too small then the equilibrium is e¢ cient, but if b is moderate then
the equilibrium is ine¢ cient. The implication is that an improvement in the budget constraint e.g.
letting buyers pay in instalments may result in e¢ ciency loss. Consider, for instance, points A
and B in Figure 1a. At point A the budget is severely low and the corresponding outcome is an
auction equilibrium, which is e¢ cient. Point B, with a slightly higher budget, lies in the partial
screening territory, which is ine¢ cient. Along the auction equilibrium at point A each store has the
same number of customers; thus the number of matches forming and resulting in trade across the
economy is as high as it can possibly be. Along the separating equilibrium at B some stores are too
depleted while others are too crowded, which means that fewer number of matches are formed and
fewer number of trades are created. Clearly, the improvement of the budget from A to B causes the
number of trades to fall, and leads to a loss of e¢ ciency.10
4 Entry Fees
In this section we extend the benchmark model by letting sellers charge an entry fee. Entry fees
can be used in conjunction with xed pricing as well as with auctions. The case with xed pricing
is considerably simpler to analyze and it delivers the basic intuition. So, given the space limit, we
take the following approach: We analyze a version of the model where xed price sellers, but not
auction sellers, may ask for an entry fee. We characterize the outcome of this version and show that
9This is not a necessary condition. One can achieve e¢ ciency with ex-ante screening, provided that high types are
instructed to shop at expensive stores and low types are instructed to shop at cheap stores and each store receives the
same total demand .
10 It is easy to produce an example with the opposite conclusion: Point C lies in the xed pricing zone, which is
e¢ cient. Moving from B to C improves e¢ ciency.
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the budget constraint becomes less binding. Then we discuss what would happen if one uses entry
fees in conjunction with auctions.
To start, suppose that xed price sellers, in addition to the list price rf , may ask for an entry
fee f . For a moment ignore auctions, i.e. suppose M = fxed pricing with entry feeg: We will
characterize the outcome when the budget constraint is slack and show that in order to avoid the
budget constraint as much as possible, sellers should set the list price rf = 0 and raise the revenue
entirely from entry fees.
If the budget constraint is slack, then all buyers are served indiscriminately. Letting xf 
xh;f + xl;f , the expected utility of a buyer (high type or low type) is given by
Uf =
1  z0 (xf )
xf
(1  rf )  f :
The rst part of Uf is the same as the expected utility in the benchmark model, given by (9), but
now the buyer has to pay a fee, so we subtract f . Note that the fee f is paid whether or not the
buyer is able to purchase the item. The list price rf ; however, is paid only if the buyer is selected
to purchase the item. The expected prot of a seller is given by
f =
1X
n=1
zn (xf ) fnf + rfg = f1  z0 (xf )grf + xff :
The expression f1  z0 (xf )grf is the expected prot in the benchmark, given by (12). With regard
to fees, on average, the seller gets xf customers and charges each one of them f , so we add xff :
Even though Uf and f have di¤erent expressions than before, the relationship
f = 1  z0(xf )  xfUf
still holds. The queue length xf , on and o¤ the equilibrium path, is determined via the indi¤erence
condition: xf > 0 if Uf = 
 else xf = 0. The seller solves
max
xf2R+
1  z0(xf )  xf
:
The rst order is given by z0 (xf ) = 
: Solving Uf = z0 (xf ) for f and rf ; we have
f +
1  z0 (xf )
xf
rf =
1  z0 (xf )  z1 (xf )
xf
: (18)
There is a continuum of pairs
 
f ; rf

satisfying this equation. One such pair is f = 0 and
rf =  (xf ) ; which corresponds to the solution in the benchmark with no entry fee. Notice however,
one can avoid the budget constraint as much as possible by setting rf = 0 and f =  (xf ) ; where
 (xf ) =
1  z0 (xf )  z1 (xf )
xf
: (19)
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To see why, note that the budget constraint is slack if
rf + f  b: (20)
In the budget constraint (20) the list price rf and the entry fee f have identical weights, 1; however
in the FOC (18) the weight of rf is smaller than the weight of f ; indeed
1 z0(xf)
xf
< 1: Since the
seller is indi¤erent between raising $1 via either channel (list price or entry fee); the optimal way of
avoiding the budget constraint is setting the list price rf = 0 and raising the revenue entirely from
f : So, WLOG we will focus on this scenario.
Given that rf = 0; it is straightforward to show that all sellers set the same entry fee f =  (xf )
and therefore get the same expected demand xf = ; so, the equilibrium entry fee is f =  () :
Substituting this into the payo¤ functions above, we see that equilibrium payo¤s for buyers and
sellers are, respectively, z0 () and  () ; which are the same as in the equilibrium with homogenous
buyers (Remark 1). One can sustain this outcome if the budget constraint is slack, i.e. if
 ()  b:
Recall that in the benchmark model with no entry fee the budget constraint was slack if  ()  b
(Proposition 2). Since  () <  () it is clear that entry fees make the budget constraint less binding
and enlarge the parameter space where the outcome with homogenous, nancially unconstrained
buyers remains intact. Now we can turn to the full-edged model.
Proposition 6 Suppose M = fxed pricing with entry fee, auctionsg. If b   () then all sellers
adopt xed pricing and charge each customer f =  () : If b < b <  () ; where b is dened
below, auctions and xed pricing coexist. Auction stores set ra = minfb; r^(xl;a)g and serve both
types of customers whereas xed price stores set f = b and serve low types only. If b  b then all
sellers adopt auctions and set the same reserve price ra = minfb; r^(l)g:
The proposition is practically the same as Proposition 5 only with new thresholds (see Fig 1b). The
nature of the equilibria remains the same (i.e. if b is large then sellers compete with xed pricing, if it
is low then they choose auctions and if it is moderate then they mix); however the budget constraint
is now less pronounced. Indeed a comparison between Figure 1a and 1b reveals that  <  and
b < b#, i.e. entry fees shrink the parameter space where the budget constraint kicks in.
The proof of the proposition is largely the same as before. The di¤erence is that we need to work
with the new expected payo¤s when dealing with xed pricing; specically instead of (9) we have
Uh;f = Ul;f =  f +
1  z0 (xh;f + xl;f )
xh;f + xl;f
and instead of (12) we have
f = (xh;f + xl;f )f :
Consequently we end up with di¤erent thresholds:  () replaces  (), b replaces b#, and xl;f
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replaces x#l;f where x

l;f solves Ul;f (b; 0; x

l;f ) = Ul;a(ra; h; l) and b
 is the unique value of b satisfying
f (b; 0; x

l;f ) = a(ra; h; l): With these modications one can prove the proposition by repeating
the previous proof almost step by step. (The proof, which is available upon request, is too repetitive
hence it is omitted.)
The next question is what happens if sellers charge an entry fee with auctions. This case is
somewhat tedious because entry fees a¤ect not only how sellers compete but also how buyers bid,
rendering expected utilities nontrivial. Given the space limit, we do not undertake this task, however
based on the analysis so far we can make an educated guess on what would happen. The reason
why auctions are competed away against xed pricing is the fact that if b is su¢ ciently large then
xed pricing can avoid the budget constraint and provide all buyers the same market utility, but
auctions cannot. With auctions high types are always prioritized over low types, that is Uh;a > Ul;a:
With entry fees, expected payo¤s Uh;a and Ul;a will have di¤erent closed form expressions but the
inequality Uh;a > Ul;a will remain.11 Indeed, in a bidding contest high types inevitably will have an
edge over low types and, as long as buyers pay the same entry fee, the inequality Uh;a > Ul;a will
persist. Consequently, we suspect, an unconstrained auction equilibrium will still fail to exist if b is
su¢ ciently large.
5 Conclusion
In markets for most big ticket items (houses, automobiles, furniture, business equipment, etc.) a
signicant number of potential buyers are budget constrained. Despite its practical importance, the
competing mechanism literature paid little attention on how the presence of nancially constrained
buyers a¤ects trading mechanism selection. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, to the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the rst attempt investigating this problem in a fully competitive setup.
Absent budget constraints, the existing literature capitulates that if buyers di¤er in their valuations
then the unique equilibrium entails all sellers holding second price auctions (McAfee, 1993) whereas
if buyers have identical valuations then a range of mechanisms are payo¤ equivalent and coexist in
the same market (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010). We show that these results are not robust to the
presence of budget constrained buyers. Merely lowering the budgets of a few buyers renders the
auction equilibrium as well as payo¤ equivalence results invalid.
Restriction attention to xed pricing and auctions we fully characterize competitive search equi-
libria where sellers compete for scarce customers, some of which are budget constrained, and show
that if buyers di¤er only slightly in terms of their ability to pay then sellers adopt xed pricing
11Consider a second price auction, where an entry fee a (n) is payable if n customers show up at the store. The fee
ought to be indexed by, and in fact, falling in n because with a rising fee, or even a at fee, if n is large then not all
bidders would participate. One can show that in the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of the second price
auction low types bid b  a(n) and high types bid 1  a(n): Given these bidding strategies, the expected payo¤ for
a buyer, conditional on being in a store with n  2 buyers (including the buyer himself), are given by
ul;a (n) =
n 1
n
(1  b)  a (n)
h
1  n 1
n
i
and uh;a (n) = n 1 (1  b)  a (n)
h
1  1 n nn 1(1 )
n(1 )
i
:
Observe that for all n  2 we have ul;a (n) < uh;a (n) : This inequality implies that Ul;a < Uh;a because Ul;a is a
weighted sum of ul;a(n)s and Uh;a is a weighted sum of uh;a(n)s:
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whereas if they di¤er too much then they adopt auctions. In between these two extremes there is
an intermediate region where they mix (i.e. both mechanisms coexist). A natural extension of the
model is where sellers may ask for an entry fee. We show that with entry fees the nature of the
equilibria remains the same sellers choose xed pricing if the budget is large, they choose auctions
if the budget is low and they mix if it is moderate but the thresholds are smaller than before;
hence the budget constraint becomes less binding. Indeed, with entry fees sellers are able to raise
the revenue from all buyers present at the store not just from the one acquiring the item which
makes the item more a¤ordable.
The result that entry fees make the budget constraint less binding is promising, but even then
if b is low enough the unconstrained equilibrium still fails to exist. So, one deduces that no matter
which mechanism sellers compete with there will be a lower bound on the budget b, below which
the unconstrained equilibrium will fail to exist. An open question, then, is how to obtain that lower
bound and how to design the optimal mechanism achieving that bound. Answering this question, of
course, requires a more general setup than ours. Specically the set of mechanisms should be large
enough to encompass a wide range of selling rules, not just xed pricing and auctions.
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Appendix
Proof of the Proposition 1. We focus on symmetric mixed strategies where type i bidders pick
the same cdf Gi (p) : [si; si]! [0; 1]. A point p is an increasing point of the distribution function Gi
if Gi is not constant in an " neighborhood of p, i.e. if for each " > 0 the probability of having a value
in (p  "; p+ ") is positive. Conversely, p is a constant point if Gi is constant in an " neighborhood
of p: If there is an atom at p; then by denition, p is an increasing point. If the pair (Gh; Gl)
corresponds to an equilibrium, then at each increasing point p of Gh high type buyers earn their
equilibrium payo¤ uh: Similarly at each increasing point p of Gl low types earn their equilibrium
payo¤ ul (Hillman and Samet, 1987; Baye et al., 1996). In words, in a mixed strategy equilibrium,
players must make their equilibrium payo¤s at all increasing points (including mass points) in the
support of their equilibrium distribution functions. These claims are immediate from the denition
of a mixed strategy equilibrium; Hillman and Samet (1987) provide a more formal discussion (see
Proposition 2 therein).
We argue that uh  n 1 (1  b) and ul  n 1n (1  b) ; where  is the probability that a customer
is a low type. To see why, note that low types cannot bid more than b; so if a high type buyer bids
slightly more than b; then even if he loses against all other high types, he can still win the item
with probability n 1. This would provide him a payo¤ n 1 (1  b) : Similarly if a low type bids b;
then in the worst case scenario he loses against all high types and ties with every other low type,
so his payo¤ is at least 
n 1
n (1  b) : Since uh  n 1 (1  b) ; a high type would not bid more than
1  n 1 (1  b), i.e. sh  1  n 1 (1  b) :
The equilibrium cdf Gh cannot have a mass point anywhere on its support [sh; sh] : Indeed a
mass point means tying with other bidders, in which case random rationing takes place and the
surplus is divided among the tying bidders. A nancially unconstrained bidder can always beat the
tie and improve his payo¤ by placing a bid that is slightly above the mass point, which, of course
is inconsistent with equilibrium. The argument applies to the entire support of Gh including the
upper bound sh: since sh is less than 1 there is room to beat a potential tie at sh: It follows that
Gh is continuos on its support with no jumps (it does not have at spots either, but more on this
below).
Now turn to Gl: The equilibrium cdf Gl cannot have an atom anywhere below b for the same
reason above, however it may have an atom at b as low types cannot bid more than b, so there are
three possibilities: (i) the entire mass is at b or (ii) there is a partial mass at b, so Gl has a continuos
tail in some region below b (iii) there is no mass at b; so Gl is continuos on its entire support. Below
we rule out the second and the third scenarios, which means that the only possible scenario is the
rst one where low types bid b with probability one:
In scenarios (ii) and (iii) Gl is assumed to be continuos over some interval [sl; sl] where sl < sl  b.
Recall that Gh is also continuos over [sh; sh] ; so there are three possible scenarios pertaining the
lower bounds: either sl <sh or sl >sh or sl =sh: Suppose sl <sh: This implies ul = 0: To see why,
note that sl is an increasing point of Gl and in a mixed strategy equilibrium any increasing point,
including sl;must yield the equilibrium payo¤ ul to the low type bidder. Bidding p = sl yields a zero
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payo¤ because the bidder is sure to lose (everyone else is sure to bid more than sl since sl <sh ); a
contradiction since ul > 0: Now suppose sl >sh: Based on similar arguments, this implies uh = 0;
again a contradiction since uh > 0. Finally if sl =sh then uh = ul = 0; which again is a contradiction.
In words, if both cdfs have continuos pieces, then the one with the lower bound on the far left is
sure to yield a zero payo¤. It follows that Gl cannot have a continuos bit anywhere below b; the
entire mass must be at point b i.e. low types must bid b with probability 1.
Since low types bid b; the lower bound of Gh must lie above b; i.e. Gh must be spread over some
interval [sh; sh] where sh  b: Indeed if sh < b then, by the arguments above, uh = 0; which would
contradict uh > 0. Since low types bid b and high types are sure to bid more than b (recall that
sh  b) the equilibrium payo¤ of a low type equals to ul = n 1n (1  b) :
Now turn to high types. As discussed earlier, Gh cannot have an atom, i.e. there are no jumps.
We now argue that it cannot have intermittent at spots either. By contradiction, suppose Gh is
constant over some interval (a1; a2)  [sh; sh]: Both a1 and a2 are increasing points of Gh; hence
both points must deliver the same payo¤ uh: Since Gh is assumed to be at over the interval (a1; a2),
the probability of winning the auction is the same at both points (notice that Gl = 1 at both points
because sh  b). This, however, means that the player gets a lower payo¤by bidding a2 than bidding
a1 since a2 > a1; a contradiction.
It follows that Gh is monotonically increasing on its support [sh; sh]; so, a high type buyer must
earn the same payo¤ uh at any point p 2 [sh; sh]: The expected payo¤ associated with bidding p is
given by
EU (p) =
n 1X
j=0

n  1
j

j (1  )n 1 j Gn 1 jh (p) (1  p) :
To understand why, note that in addition to the high type buyer in question, there are n  1 other
buyers in the store. The buyer knows only his own type, however, given the Poisson arrival rates,
he understands that with probability
 
n 1
j

j (1  )n 1 j there are j low types and n  1  j high
types present in the auction (excluding himself). Consequently, his bid p 2 [sh; sh] wins the auction
with probability Gn 1 jh (p) (observe that, since sh  b; low types are outbid with probability one).
The binomial theorem implies that
EU (p) = [ + (1  )Gh (p)]n 1 (1  p) :
High types must earn their equilibrium payo¤ uh at any point p 2 [sh; sh]; i.e.
EU (p) = uh ) Gh (p) =

uh
1 p
 1
n 1   
1   :
We know Gh (sh) = 0 and Gh (sh) = 1; hence uh = 
n 1 (1  sh) and uh = 1   sh: Recall that
uh  n 1 (1  b) and that sh  b: This means sh = b and uh = n 1 (1  b) and therefore sh =
1  n 1 (1  b) : Substituting for uh yields the expression of Gh in the body of the Proposition.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Start with xed pricing. Note that
xh;fUh;f + xl;fUl;f = 1  z0(xh;f + xl;f )  f1  z0(xh;f + xl;f )grf ;
where Uh;f and Ul;f are given by (9). Recall that f = f1  z0(xh;f + xl;f )grf ; hence
f = 1  z0 (xh;f + xl;f )  xh;fUh;f   xl;fUl;f :
Note that if rf > b then xl;f = 0 and the relationship still holds. Now consider auctions. Note that
z1 (x) = xz0 (x) and z0 (x+ y) = z0 (x) z0 (y). It follows that
xh;aUh;a + xl;aUl;a = z0 (xh;a) + z1 (xh;a)  z0 (xh;a + xl;a)  z1 (xh;a + xl;a) ra +
 b fz0 (xh;a) + z1 (xh;a)  z0 (xh;a + xl;a)  z1 (xh;a + xl;a)g ;
where Uh;a and Ul;a are given by (7) and (8). The expected prot a is given by (11). A term by
term comparison reveals that
a = 1  z0 (xh;a + xl;a)  xh;aUh;a   xl;aUl;a;
conrming the validity of the relationship under auctions. Again if ra > b then xl;a = 0 and the
relationship is still valid.
Proof of Proposition 2. If b   () then the xed price equilibrium in the homogenous model
(described in Remark 1) remains intact, because the equilibrium list price  () is less than b: The
equilibrium is unique, because, as we show below, if b   () then a separating equilibrium, where
di¤erent sellers cater to di¤erent types of customers, fails to exist.
If b   (h), then low types are screened out completely. To see why, ignore low types for a
moment i.e. suppose that sellers target high types only: This reduces the buyer-seller ratio to h.
Since sellers face nancially unconstrained buyers, per Remark 1, they post (h) and consequently
earn (h): If b is too small then this outcome remains an equilibrium even if low types are present
in the market. Indeed if b  (h) then no seller would be willing to deviate and cater to low types,
because doing so can at most bring in a revenue b which is less than (h). Uniqueness, again,
follows from the fact that (established below) if b   (h) then a separating equilibrium fails to
exits.
Now, suppose  (h) < b <  () : In this region b is neither large enough to slacken the budget
constraint nor small enough to justify ignoring low types altogether. The only possible outcome
is a separating equilibrium where a fraction of sellers are expensive, catering to high types, while
remaining sellers are a¤ordable catering to both types (as it turns out, high types avoid shopping
at these stores). Below we characterize this equilibrium. To start, focus on an expensive store with
rf > b and let xh;f be his expected demand consisting of high type buyers (clearly xl;f = 0). The
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sellers expected prot equals to
f = 1  z0(xh;f )  xh;fUf (rf ; xh;f ; 0) ;
where
Uf (rf ; xh;f ; 0) =
1  z0(xh;f )
xh;f
(1  rf ):
The expected demand xh;f satises the indi¤erence constraint Uf (rf ; xh;f ; 0) = 
h: Substituting the
constraint into the objective function, the seller solves
max
xh;f
1  z0(xh;f )  xh;f
h:
The FOC is given by z0(xh;f ) = 
h. The second order condition is negative; hence the solution
to the FOC corresponds to the global maximum. Solving Uf (rf ; xh;f ; 0) = z0(xh;f ) for rf yields
rf = (xh;f ). Substituting this into f reveals that f =  (xh;f ) : Note that all expensive sellers
post the same list price: To see why, consider another expensive seller with price r0f > b: His problem
is similar: the FOC of his prot maximization problem is given by z0(x0h;f ) = 
h and therefore
r0f = (x
0
h;f ): Since both z0(x
0
h;f ) and z0(xh;f ) are equal to 
h, we have xh;f = x
0
h;f : Note that  is
one-to-one, hence rf = r0f :
Now consider an a¤ordable store with the list price ~rf  b and let ~xh;f and ~xl;f be the queue
lengths. We conjecture that (to be veried) a¤ordable stores attract low types only, i.e. ~xh;f = 0
and ~xl;f > 0 which means Uf (~rf ; 0; ~xl;f ) = 
l < 
h. Recall that Uf (rf ; xh;f ; 0) = 
h. It follows
that Uf (~rf ; 0; ~xl;f ) < Uf (rf ; xh;f ; 0) i.e.
1  z0(~xl;f )
~xl;f
(1  ~rf ) < 1  z0(xh;f )
xh;f
(1  rf ):
Since rf > ~rf we have ~xl;f > xh;f ; i.e. a¤ordable stores are more crowded than expensive stores.
We now show that ~rf = b: The a¤ordable stores problem is
max
~xl;f
1  z0(~xl;f )  ~xl;f
l:
Di¤erentiating wrt ~xl;f yields the rst order condition 
l = z0 (~xl;f ). Notice, however, the FOC
cannot hold with equality, i.e. 
l 6= z0(~xl;f ). Indeed, if 
l = z0(~xl;f ) then U (~rf ; 0; ~xl;f ) = z0(~xl;f )
which, in turn, implies that ~rf = (~xl;f ). Recall that expensive stores post rf = (xh;f ): Since
~xl;f > xh;f we have (~xl;f ) > (xh;f ) i.e. ~rf > rf ; a contradiction because rf must exceed ~rf . From
the a¤ordable sellers point of view, setting ~rf = (~xl;f ) > b maximizes the expected prot, however
this interior solution is outside of the feasible region [0; b]. Global concavity of the objective function
implies that the seller ought to post the corner price ~rf = b: This argument applies to all a¤ordable
stores; hence all such stores post ~rf = b and earn ~f = f1  z0 (~xl;f )gb:
Since all expensive stores post the same list price rf and all a¤ordable stores post the same list
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price b the feasibility equations in (15) become
'~xh;f + (1  ')xh;f = h and '~xl;f + (1  ')xl;f = l;
where ' denotes the fraction of a¤ordable stores. Substituting ~xh;f = 0 and xl;f = 0 we have
xh;f = h= (1  ') and ~xl;f = l=': (21)
Recall that ~xl;f > xh;f ; so we must have ' < l= = . The value of ' is pinned down by the equal
prot condition f = ~f , where
f =  (h= (1  ')) and ~f = f1  z0 (~xl;f )gb:
Note that f rises whereas ~f falls in '. Letting   f   ~f , note that d=d' > 0 and
(0) =  (h)  b and () =  ()  f1  z0 ()gb:
It follows that if (h) < b <  () then, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique
' 2 (0; ) satisfying f = ~f , i.e. there exists a unique separating equilibrium. Note that outside
this parameter region a separating equilibrium fails to exist. To complete the proof, we need to show
that 
l < 
h; which veries our earlier conjecture that high types indeed stay away from a¤ordable
stores. Note that

h = z0(x

h;f ) and 
l =
1  z0(xh;f )
~xl;f
(1  b):
The fact that f = ~f implies b = (xh;f )=(1  z0(~xl;f )); thus

h   
l =
z0(x

h;f )
~xl;f
fq   1 + e qg; where q  ~xl;f   xh;f :
Note that q is positive because ~xl;f > x

h;f : The expression in curly brackets is positive for all q > 0;
hence 
h > 
l: This veries the earlier conjecture and completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof consists of two steps:
Step 1. We show that no auction seller sets a reserve price above b. By contradiction, suppose a
store has ~ra > b: Since ~ra is exceeds b we have ~xh;a > 0 and ~xl;a = 0. The expected utility of a high
type buyer visiting this store equals to
~Uh;a  Uh;a(~ra; ~xh;a; 0) = z0(~xh;a)(1  ~ra);
whereas the expected prot of the store equals to
~a  a(~ra; ~xh;a; 0) = 1  z0(~xh;a)  ~xh;a ~Uh;a:
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These expressions are obtained by substituting ~xl;a = 0 into (7) and (11). Below we demonstrate
that if this store posts b instead of ~ra then he can do better than ~a while providing high types with
the same utility ~Uh;a. If the seller posts b then he gets some low types as well as some high types,
so let x0l;a and x
0
h;a denote his new expected demands. Substituting ra = b into (7) and (8) yields
buyersexpected utilities visiting this store:
U 0h;a  Uh;a(b; x0h;a; x0l;a) = z0(x0h;a) (1  b) and U 0l;a  Ul;a(b; x0h;a; x0l;a) = z0(x0h)
1  z0 (x0l)
x0l
(1  b) :
Combining these expressions with (13) we obtain the expected prot of the seller who posts b:
0a  a(b; x0h;a; x0l;a) = 1  z0(x0h;a)  z1(x0h;a) + bz1(x0h;a) + bz0(x0h;a)[1  z0(x0l;a)]:
We will show that 0a > ~a when U 0h;a = ~Uh;a i.e. when the seller provides high types with the same
level of utility: Note that
U 0h;a = ~Uh;a , z0(x0h;a) (1  b) = z0(~xh;a) (1  ~ra) ;
which implies that x0h;a > ~xh;a since ra > b: The last term in 
0
a is positive; hence, to show 
0
a >
~a
it su¢ ces to show that  is positive, where
  z0(~xh;a)  z0(x0h;a) + z1(x0h;a)(1  ~ra)  z1(~xh;a) (1  b) :
Substitute z0(x0h;a) (1  b) = z0(~xh;a) (1  ~ra) into  and rearrange to obtain
 = z0(x
0
h;a) feq   1  (1  b) qg ;
where q  x0h;a   ~xh;a > 0: The expression inside the curly brackets is positive for all q > 0; hence
 > 0; and therefore 0a > ~a; i.e. the deviation is protable. So, no auction seller sets a reserve
price above b:
Step 2. We show that every auction store must attract both types of customers i.e. there cannot
be an outcome where a store attracts low types only or high types only. There are three possibilities
for an auction store: (a) It attracts high types only i.e. xh;a > 0 and xl;a = 0. (b) It attracts
low types only, i.e. xh;a = 0 and xl;a > 0: (c) It attracts both types i.e. xh;a > 0 and xl;a > 0.
Scenario (a) is not possible. To see why suppose indeed xh;a > 0 and xl;a = 0: This means that
Uh;a (ra; xh;a; 0) = 
h and Ul;a (ra; xh;a; 0) < 
l: Notice, however, Ul;a (ra; xh;a; 0) = Uh;a (ra; xh;a; 0).
This, in turn, means that 
h < 
l; a contradiction, since 
h  
l:
Scenario (b) is not possible, either. By way of contradiction, suppose that there is a seller
who attracts low types only, i.e. his queue lengths are xh;a = 0 and xl;a > 0: This means that
Uh;a (ra; 0; xl;a) < 
h and Ul;a (ra; 0; xl;a) = 
l. Furthermore, since xl > 0 we have Ul;a (ra; 0; xl;a) <
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Uh;a (ra; 0; xl;a) and therefore 
l < 
h: The expected prot of this seller equals to
a = 1  z0(xl;a)  xl;aUl;a:
Since Ul;a = 
l; the sellers problem is
max
xl;a
1  z0(xl;a)  xl;a
l:
The rst order condition yields 
l = z0(xl;a): The second order condition is always negative; hence
the solution of FOC corresponds to a global maximum. Solving Ul;a = z0(xl;a) for ra yields ra = 
where
  1  z0(xl;a)  z1(xl;a)
z1(xl;a)
(1  b) :
Observe that the reserve price ra needs be less than or equal to b (Step 1); hence there are two cases:
Either   b and therefore 
l = z0(xl;a). Or  > b, in which case ra = b and therefore 
l > z0(xl;a):
Considering both possibilities, we have 
l  z0(xl;a):
Under our conjecture this store is attracting low types only; so high types must be shopping
elsewhere. Since M = fauctionsg; the stores where high types shop must be auction stores. We
already know that no auction store caters to high types only (scenario (a) above); so, some auction
stores must be catering to both types of customers. Consider such a store and let r0a be its reserve
price and x0h;a > 0 and x
0
l;a > 0 be its queue lengths. Since x
0
h;a and x
0
l;a are both positive we have
U 0h;a = 
h and U
0
l;a = 
l: The stores expected prot equals to
0a = 1  z0(x0h;a + x0l;a)  x0h;a
h   x0l;a
l:
Both stores must be earning equal prots, i.e. (i) a = 0a: We have already established that
(ii) Ul;a = 
l = U 0l;a and (iii) Uh;a < 
h = U
0
h;a: Below we show that these relationships cannot hold
together, rendering scenario (b) infeasible. To start, note that the equal prot condition requires
 = 0; where
  0a  a = z0(xl;a) + xl;a
l   z0(x0h;a + x0l;a)  x0h;a
h   x0l;a
l:
Fix x0h;a + x
0
l;a and note that if xl;a = x
0
h;a + x
0
l;a then  < 0 because 
h > 
l: In addition
@=@xl;a = 
l   z0(xl;a); which is positive because 
l  z0(xl;a): It follows that  = 0 is possible
only if xl;a > x0h;a+x
0
l;a: Since Ul;a = U
0
l;a = 
l and Uh;a < U
0
h;a = 
h we have U
0
h;a U 0l;a > Uh;a Ul;a;
which is equivalent to
xl;a   1 + z0(xl;a)
xl;a
< z0(x
0
h;a)
x0l;a   1 + z0(x0l;a)
x0l;a
: (22)
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Note that the expression [x  1 + z0 (x)]=x rises in x: Since xl;a > x0h;a + x0l;a we have
xl;a   1 + z0(xl;a)
xl;a
>
x0l;a   1 + z0(x0l;a)
x0l;a
;
which contradicts (22) because z0(x0h;a) < 1: To sum up, the equal prot condition in (i) cannot
hold together with restrictions (ii) and (iii); thus, scenario (b), where an auction store attracts low
types only fails to exist. Hence the only possible scenario is (c). This outcome is characterized in
Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 3 established that every auction seller must be attracting both
types of customers. So consider a seller with reserve price ra and queue lengths xh;a > 0 and xl;a > 0.
His expected prot equals to
a = 1  z0(xh;a + xl;a)  xh;aUh;a   xl;aUl;a;
where Uh;a and Ul;a are given by (7) and (8). The sellers problem is
max
ra; xh;a; xl;a
a subject to Uh;a = 
h and Ul;a = 
l:
Both constraints must bind as the store must be attracting both types of customers. The FOC is
given by
da
dra
= [z0(xl;a + xh;a)  
h]dxh;a
dra
+ [z0(xl;a + xh;a)  
l]dxl;a
dra
= 0:
The General Implicit Function Theorem implies that
dxh;a
dra
=
detB
detA
and
dxl;a
dra
=
detB
detA
;
where
A =
24 @Uh;a@xh;a @Uh;a@xl;a
@Ul;a
@xh;a
@Ul;a
@xl;a
35 ; B =
24  @Uh;a@ra @Uh;a@xl;a
 @Ul;a@ra
@Ul;a
@xl;a
35 ; B =
24 @Uh;a@xh;a  @Uh;a@ra
@Ul;a
@xh;a
 @Ul;a@ra
35 :
Inspecting (7) and (8) one can verify that for i = h; l we have
@Ui;a
@ra
=  z0(xl;a + xh;a); @Ui;a
@xh;a
=  Ui;a; @Uh;a
@xl;a
=  z0(xl;a + xh;a) (b  ra)
@Ul;a
@xl;a
=  z0(xl;a + xh;a)(1  ra)  z0(xh;a) (1  b) (xl;a)  xl;az1(xl;a)
x2l;a
:
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Observe that (i) 0 < Ul;a < Uh;a and (ii) @Ul;a=@xl;a < @Uh;a=@xl;a < 0: It follows that
detA = Ul;a
@Uh;a
@xl;a
  Uh;a@Ul;a
@xl;a
> 0;
detB =  z
2
0(xh;a)z0(xl;a)
x2l;a
(1  b)(xl;a) < 0;
detB =
z20(xh;a)z0(xl;a)
x2l;a
(1  b) (1  xl;a   z0(xl;a)) < 0:
Substitute Uh;a = 
h and Ul;a = 
l into da=dra to obtain
da
dra
=
z0(xh;a)
detA
[c1ra   c2];
where
c1 = z0(xl;a)
 
detB + detB

< 0;
c2 = (1  b) [(1  z0(xl;a)) detB + (xl;a) detB=xl;a] < 0:
Solving the FOC for ra we obtain
da
dra
= 0, ra = c2
c1
 r^ (xl;a) :
Straightforward algebra reveals that
r^(x) =
x  z1 (x)  xz1 (x)
z0 (x)  z20 (x) + xz1 (x)  z1 (x)
(1  b) : (23)
To verify the SOC note that z0 (xh;a) =detA > 0 since detA > 0: It follows that
sign (da=dra) = sign (c1ra   c2) :
Observe that c1 and c2 are negative constants since detB and detB are both negative and indepen-
dent of ra. Therefore da=dra > 0 for all ra < r^ and da=dra < 0 for all ra > r^, which means that
the objective function is globally concave and ra = r^ is the unique maximum. Recall, however the
reserve price must be less than or equal to b (Lemma 3), so if r^  b then the seller posts ra = r^ but
if r^ > b then he posts ra = b:
To prove uniqueness we show that all auction stores post the same reserve price. Consider two
auction sellers, k and j; one with price rka = minfb; r^(xkl;a)g and queue lengths xkh;a and xkl;a and the
other with price rja = minfr^(xjl;a); bg and queue lengths xjh;a and xjl;a: Both stores must be providing
their customers with the same market utilities, i.e. Uh;a(rka ; x
k
h;a; x
k
l;a) = U
j
h;a(r
j
a; x
j
h;a; x
j
l;a) = 
h and
Ul;a(r
k
a ; x
k
h;a; x
k
l;a) = U
j
l;a(r
j
a; x
j
h;a; x
j
l;a) = 
l. Basic algebra reveals that these relationships hold i¤
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(xkl;a) = (x
j
l;a) where
(xkl;a) 
z0(x
k
l;a)(1  rka) + [1  z0(xkl;a)] (1  b)
z0(xkl;a)(1  rka) + [1  z0(xkl;a)  z1(xkl;a)] (1  b) =xkl;a
:
There are three sub-cases here:
 Both prices are interior, i.e. rka = r^(xkl;a) < b and rja = r^(xjl;a) < b: Substituting rka = r^(xkl;a)
reveals that  is a 1-1 function; thus the fact that (xkl;a) = (x
j
l;a) implies that x
k
l;a = x
j
l;a and
therefore rka = r
j
a:
 Both prices are corner, i.e. rka = b and rja = b, which, of course means that rka = rja:
 One price is interior and the other is corner, i.e. rka = b while rja = r^(xjl;a) < b: Straightforward
algebra reveals that one cannot have Ukh;a = U
j
h;a and U
k
l;a = U
j
l;a together with the equal prot
condition ka = 
j
a: Hence such an outcome fails to exist.
Since all sellers post the same reserve price, symmetry in buyers visiting strategies implies that the
queue length at each store is identical that is xkh;a = h and x
k
l;a = l for all k: This completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1. We will prove that auction stores advertise ra = minfb; r^(xl;a)g and cater to both types of
customers. This claim appears to be a repetition of Lemma 3 above; however, that lemma was based
on a setting with M = fauctionsg whereas in here M = fxed pricing, auctionsg; which poses new
alternatives where buyers may shop. First note that no auction seller sets ra > b as he can do better
by setting ra = b. This claim is established in the proof of Lemma 3; the proof remains valid here.
As for customer demographics, note that an auction store with price ra  b faces three scenarios: (a)
it attracts high types only and low types stay away (b) it attracts low types only and high types stay
away (c) it attracts both types. Scenario (a) can be ruled out using the same arguments in the proof
of Lemma 3, but there is a subtlety here. One can construct a scenario where all low types shop
at xed price stores and high types at auction stores and all players earn the same expected utility;
however, such an outcome requires coordination among buyers on where to shop when indi¤erent.
Specically, low types ought to coordinate among themselves not to show up at an auction store
(and high types ought to coordinate among themselves not to show up at xed prices stores) even
though they are indi¤erent. Given the large number of buyers in the market, such coordination is
not plausible, so we rule out this possibility. Scenario (b) is also impossible, and its proof is largely
the same as before; however there is an additional possibility here: if the store attracts low types
only then high types might be shopping at xed price stores. Below we rule out this possibility,
which will leave scenario (c) as the only possible outcome.
If the auction seller indeed attracts low types only then xh;a = 0 and xl;a > 0: This means that
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Ul;a(ra; 0; xl;a) = 
l and Uh;a(ra; 0; xl;a) < 
h; where
Uh;a(ra; 0; xl;a) = z0 (xl;a) (1  ra) + [1  z0 (xl;a)] (1  b) :
Since xl;a > 0 we have Ul;a < Uh;a and therefore 
l < 
h: Now consider a xed price store where
high types might be shopping. There are two cases: (i) rf > b or (ii) rf  b:
Case 1. If rf > b then xl;f = 0 and xh;f > 0. The expected utility of a high type buyer at this
store is given by Uh;f (rf ; xh;f ; 0): The fact that xh;f > 0 implies Uh;f = 
h: Recall that Uh;a < 
h;
hence Uh;f > Uh;a: Since rf > b we have Uh;f (rf ; xh;f ; 0) < 1   b: On the other hand, note that
Uh;a(ra; 0; xl;a)  1  b; since ra  b: It follows that Uh;a > Uh;f ; a contradiction.
Case 2. Now suppose rf  b: Since the price is a¤ordable, high types and low types obtain the
same expected utility there, i.e. Uh;f = Ul;f : The fact that high types shop at the xed price store
implies Uh;f = 
h: The market utility of a low type 
l, by denition, must be greater than or equal
to his expected payo¤ at the xed price store i.e. 
l  Ul;f : Furthermore recall that 
l  
h: It
follows that 
l = 
h: The fact that the auction store attracts low types only implies Uh;a < 
h
and Ul;a = 
l: Since Uh;a > Ul;a we have 
h > 
l: This, of course, contradicts 
h = 
l: Hence this
possibility, too, is ruled out.
It follows that an auction store must attract both types of customers i.e. queue lengths xh;a and
xl;a are both positive satisfying Uh;a = 
h and Ul;a = 
l. Hence an auction seller solves
max
ra; xh;a;xl;a
a subject to Uh;a = 
h and Ul;a = 
l:
This problem is analyzed in the proof of Proposition 3. Following the same steps, one can show that
all auction sellers post the same reserve price ra = minfb; r^ (xl;a)g; where r^ is given by (23): This
completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2. We will show that all xed price sellers post rf = minfb; (xh;f + xl;f )g: We start by
demonstrating that no seller posts a price above b: By way of contradiction, suppose a xed price
seller advertises rf > b: Letting xh;f denote his queue length consisting of high types (clearly
xl;f = 0), the seller solves
max
rf ;xh;f
f1  z0(xh;f )grf s.t. 1  z0(xh;f )
xh;f
(1  rf ) = 
h:
This problem is analyzed earlier. The solution entails the seller posting rf = (xh;f ) and earning
(xh;f ); where  and  are given by (17) and (16). High type buyers visiting this store earn
Uh;f = z0(xh;f ). Below we show that if this seller switches to auctions then he can earn more than
(xh;f ) while still providing high types with utility 
h. Thus, the above outcome cannot be an
equilibrium.
Per Lemma 4, if the seller switches to auctions, then he must attract both types of customers and
post ra = minfr^(xl;a); bg. Since he attracts both types of customers we have Uh;a(ra; xh;a; xl;a) = 
h
and Ul;a(ra; xh;a; xl;a) = 
l: Note that dr^=db < 0; so x xl;a and let b be the unique value of b
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satisfying r^(b; xl;a) = b. There are two cases:
Case 1. Suppose that b  b: Since r^  b the seller posts ra = b: Basic algebra reveals that
r^  1  z0(xl;a)
z0(xl;a)
(1  b) :
Since r^  b it follows that z0(xl;a) < 1  b: Substitute ra = b into (7) and (11) to obtain
Uh;a = z0(xh;a) (1  b) and a = 1  (1  b) fz0(xh;a) + z1(xh;a)g   bz0(xh;a + xl;a):
Recall that (i) Uh;f = z0(xh;f ), (ii) Uh;f = 
h and (iii) Uh;a = 
h: This means that
z0(xh;f ) = z0(xh;a) (1  b), xh;f   xh;a =   ln (1  b) :
Now we can check prots:
a   (xh;f ) = (1 + xh;f )z0(xh;f )  (1  b) fz0(xh;a) + z1(xh;a)g   bz0(xh;a + xl;a)
= (xh;f   xh;a) (1  b) z0(xh;a)  bz0(xh;a + xl;a)
=   (1  b) z0(xh;a) ln (1  b)  bz0(xh;a + xl;a):
It follows that a > ,  1 bb ln (1  b) > z0(xl;a): Recall that z0(xl;a) < 1  b: Therefore, a > 
if
 1  b
b
ln (1  b)  1  b:
It is straightforward to verify that this inequality is satised for all b 2 (0; 1) : Hence the deviation
is protable.
Case 2. Now suppose b > b: The previous step establishes that switching to auctions is protable
even if the seller sets the corner reserve price ra = b: Now that the budget is su¢ ciently high,
the deviating seller can set the interior reserve price ra = r^(b; xl;a) and earn even more. More
specically the previous step has a(b0; xh;a; xl;a) >  for all b0  b: The concavity of the objective
function implies that a (b0; ) < a(r^(b0; xl;a); ). It is straightforward to show that da=db > 0 thus
a(r^(b
0; xl;a); ) < a(r^(b; xl;a); ) for all b > b  b0. Combining these inequalities, we have  <
a(r^(b; xl;a); ) for all b > b i.e. the deviation is protable.
So, the store must post rf  b. Since rf is below b we have Ul;f = Uh;f . The sellers problem is
max
rf ;xl;f ;xh;f
f1  z0(xl;f + xh;f )grf s.t. 1  z0(xl;f + xh;f )
xl;f + xh;f
(1  rf ) = 
:
This is analyzed earlier. The objective function is globally concave; the FOC is given by z0(xl;f +
xh;f ) = 
; hence rf = (xl;f + xh;f ). The constraint rf 2 [0; b] along with the concavity of the
objective function implies that if (xl;f + xh;f ) > b then rf = b: It follows that rf = minfb; (xl;f +
xh;f )g: Following the steps in the proof of Proposition 2 it is easy to show that all xed price sellers
post the same list price: either they all post the same interior price (xh;f + xl;f ) or they all post
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the corner price b. In either case the queue lengths at each store must be identical: This completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Conjecture an outcome where all sellers compete with auctions. Per
Lemma 4, all sellers set the same reserve price ra = minfb; r^(xl;a)g and cater to both types of
customers. Symmetry in buyersvisiting strategies implies that xl;a = l and xh;a = h; so, the total
demand at each store is l + h = .
Claim 1. In the auction equilibrium market utilities satisfy 
h > z0() > 
l.
Since b < 1 we have Uh;a > Ul;a and therefore 
h > 
l. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3
that the FOC of an auction seller is given by
da
dra
= [z0(xh;a + xl;a)  
h]dxh;a
dra
+ [z0(xl;a + xh;a)  
l]dxl;a
dra
= 0:
Both dxh;adra and
dxl;a
dra
are negative; thus for dadra = 0 to hold, the expressions in the rst and the
second square brackets must have opposite signs. Since 
h > 
l the rst expression is negative and
the second one is positive; that is 
h > z0(xl;a + xh;a) > 
l: In equilibrium xl;a = l and xh;a = h;
hence the inequality 
h > z0 () > 
l follows.
Claim 2. If b is su¢ ciently large then the auction equilibrium fails to exist.
The fact that 
h > 
l presents a deviation opportunity. Below we show that if a seller switches
to xed pricing and targets low type customers (by providing them with the same utility 
l) then
he will earn more. Note that if the xed price seller provides his customers with payo¤ 
l then he
will attract low types only. Indeed the facts (i) Uh;f = Ul;f and (ii) 
h > 
l imply that Uh;f < 
h;
hence xh;f = 0: The sellers problem is
max
rf ;xl;f
1  z0(xl;f )  xl;fUl;f s.t. Ul;f = 
l:
The problem is analyzed earlier. The FOC is given by z0 (xl;f ) = 
l and therefore seller posts
rf =  (xl;f ) and earns  (xl;f ) : For this solution to be feasible we need  (xl;f ) < b; which is the
case if b is su¢ ciently large. The fact that 
h > z0() > 
l and z0 (xf ) = 
l implies
z0() > z0 (xl;f )) xl;f > 
i.e. the xed price store attracts more buyers than an auction store. We now compare prots. An
auction seller earns
a = 1  z0 ()  h
h   l
l
whereas the xed price seller earns
 (xl;f ) = 1  z0 (xl;f )  xl;f
l:
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We want to show that  > a. Since 
h > 
l; it su¢ ces to show  > 0; where
  z0 ()  z0 (xl;f ) + (  xl;f ) 
l:
Substituting 
l = z0 (xl;f ) into  and re-arranging we have  = eq   1  q; where q  xl;f    > 0:
Note that  > 0 because q is positive; hence the xed price seller earns more. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. SinceM = fxed pricing, auctionsg; there are three equilibria to consider:
 E1. All sellers adopt xed pricing.
 E2. Some sellers adopt xed pricing while others adopt auctions.
 E3. All sellers adopt auctions.
Start with E2, i.e. consider an outcome where both rules coexist in the same market. Per Lemma
4, sellers competing with auctions advertise the same reserve price ra = minfb; r^(xl;a)g and cater
to both types of customers, which means that xh;a and xl;a are both positive satisfying Uh;a = 
h
and Ul;a = 
l. Since Uh;a > Ul;a we have 
h > 
l: In addition, sellers competing with xed pricing
advertise the same price rf = minf(xh;f + xl;f ); bg; however it is not clear what type of customers
they attract. There are three possible scenarios:
(i) They attract high types only i.e. xl;f = 0, xh;f > 0. This implies Uh;f = 
h and Ul;f < 
l: Since
Uh;f = Ul;f we have 
h < 
l; a contradiction because 
h > 
l:
(ii) They attract both types i.e. xh;f > 0; xl;f > 0: This implies Ul;f = 
l and Uh;f = 
h; which in
turn indicates that 
l = 
l; again, a contradiction because 
h > 
l:
(iii) They attract low types only i.e. xl;f > 0; xh;f = 0. This scenario is possible as it implies
Ul;f = 
l and Uh;f < 
h; which is consistent with 
h > 
l. Below we will explore this scenario.
Claim 1. Along E2 xed price stores are more crowded than auction stores, that is xl;f > xl;a+xh;a:
Since xh;f = 0, we have rf = minf(xl;f ); bg: If rf = (xl;f ) then buyers visiting xed price stores
earn Ul;f (; 0; xl;f ) = z0(xl;f ): If rf = b then they earn Ul;f (b; 0; xl;f ) > z0(xl;f ): Combining both
possibilities we have Ul;f  z0(xl;f ): Now, turn to auction stores. Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition
4 reveals that 
h > z0(xl;a + xh;a) > 
l and therefore Uh;a > z0(xl;a + xh;a) > Ul;a. Since Ul;f =
Ul;a = 
l and Ul;a < z0 (xl;a + xh;a) we have z0(xl;f ) < z0 (xl;a + xh;a), which in turn indicates that
xl;a + xh;a < xl;f :
Claim 2. If b <  () then along E2 xed price stores post rf = b:
We have already established that sellers competing with the same rule set the same reserve price;
hence the feasibility equations in (15) become
xl;a + (1  )xl;f = l and xh;a + (1  )xh;f = h;
36
where  represents the fraction of sellers adopting auctions. Furthermore recall that xl;f > 0,
xh;f = 0, xh;a > 0 and xl;a > 0; hence
xh;a = h=; xh;f = 0 and xl;a + (1  )xl;f = l.
Since (i)  (xl;a + xh;a) + (1  )xl;f = h + l =  and (ii) xl;f > xh;a + xl;a, we have
xl;f >  > xl;a + xh;a:
This, in turn, means that  2 (h=; 1). Since xl;f >  we have (xl;f ) >  () : So, if b <  () then
all xed price stores post rf = minfb; (xl;f )g = b:
Claim 3. If b# < b <  () then there exists a unique separating equilibrium where a fraction
 2 (h=; 1) of sellers compete with auctions while remaining sellers compete with xed pricing.
We start by exploring how the expected prots a and f respond to a change in : Recall that
the expected prot of an auction seller is given by
a (ra; xh;a; xl;a) = z1 (xh;a + xl;a) ra + 1  z0 (xh;a)  z1 (xh;a)
+bfz0 (xh;a) + z1 (xh;a)  z0 (xh;a + xl;a)  z1 (xh;a + xl;a)g;
where ra = minfr^(xl;a); bg. Furthermore, per Claim 2, xed price sellers earn
f (b; 0; xl;f ) = f1  z0(xl;f )gb:
Note that
df
d
= bz0(xl;f )
dxl;f
d
;
where dxl;f=d = (l   xl;a) = (1  )2 ; which is positive since  > xl;a. It follows that df=d > 0:
Now turn to a: We have
da
d
= z1 (xh;a) b
dxh;a
d
+ z0 (xh;a + xl;a) ra
d (xh;a + xl;a)
d
+z1 (xh;a + xl;a) (b  ra) d (xh;a + xl;a)
d
+ z1 (xh;a + xl;a)
@ra
@xl;a
dxl;a
d
;
where dxh;a=d =  h=2 < 0 and dxl;a=d =  (xl;f   )=2; which is negative since xl;f > :
Note that b   ra is non-negative since ra = min (r^; b). In addition, @ra=@xl;a is either positive (if
r^  b) or zero (if r^ > b). It follows that da=d < 0. Thus   f  a rises in :
Recall that  2 (h=; 1). At the lower bound where  = h= we have xh;a = , xl;a = 0,
xl;f = ; and therefore, r^ (xl;a) = 0. Auction sellers earn a (0; ; 0) =  () and xed price sellers
earn f (b; 0; ) = f1   z0 ()gb: If b <  () then f < a i.e.  < 0: At the upper bound where
 = 1 we have xh;a = h, xl;a = l; and xl;f = x
#
l;f ; where x
#
l;f solves Ul;f (b; 0; x
#
l;f ) = Ul;a(ra; h; l),
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i.e.
1  z0(x#l;f )
x#l;f
(1  b) = Ul;a(ra; h; l): (24)
Fixed price sellers earn f (b; 0; x
#
l;f ) = f1  z0(x#l;f )gb whereas auction sellers earn a(ra; h; l): If
b# < b, where b# is the unique value of b satisfying
a(ra; h; l) = f1  z0(x#l;f )gb; (25)
then a < f ; i.e.  > 0: Recall that  rises in : The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that if
b# < b <  () then there exists a unique  2 (h=; 1) satisfying the equal prot condition  = 0;
i.e. the separating equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Claim 4. If b# < b then E3, where all seller adopt auctions, fails to exist. If b <  () then E1,
where all sellers adopt xed pricing, fails to exist.
Consider E3, i.e. conjecture an equilibrium where all sellers adopt auctions. In such an equi-
librium sellers earn a (ra; h; l) : Recall that if b# < b then f (b; 0; x
#
l;f ) > a (ra; h; l), which
implies that a seller can earn more than a by deviating to xed pricing and posting b: Such a
seller would attract low types only and he can provide them with the same expected utility they
were getting at auction stores; indeed, recall that x#l;f satises Ul;f (b; 0; x
#
l;f ) = Ul;a (ra; h; l) : Since
there is a protable deviation, E3 fails to exist in the region b# < b:
Now consider E1 i.e. conjecture an outcome where all sellers compete via xed pricing. We have
established that if M = fauctions, xed pricingg then all xed price stores advertise the same price
rf = minf(xl;f +xh;f ); bg: Since buyers follow symmetric visiting strategies, all such stores have the
same queue lengths xh;f = h and xl;f = l; hence xl;f + xh;f = : It follows that when b <  () all
sellers post rf = minf(); bg = b earning f = f1  z0 ()gb, while providing buyers
Uh;f = Ul;f =
1  z0 ()

(1  b) :
Note that since  () > b we have Uh;f > z0 (). We will show that a seller can earn more by
switching to auctions while providing high types with the same utility, i.e. satisfying Uh;a = Uh;f :
Note that low types would stay away from the deviating store, i.e. xl;a = 0. Indeed if xl;a > 0 then
Ul;a < Uh;a. Since Uh;a = Uh;f and Uh;f = Ul;f ; this would mean Ul;a < Ul;f ; which in turn would
imply xl;a = 0; a contradiction.
Since xh;a > 0 and xl;a = 0 we have
Uh;a = z0 (xh;a) (1  ra) and a = 1  z0 (xh;a)  xh;aUh;a:
The sellers problem is maxra; xh;a a s.t Uh;a = Uh;f ; taking Uh;f as given. Substituting the con-
straint, the seller solves
max
xh;a
1  z0 (xh;a)  xh;aUh;f :
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The rst order condition is given by z0 (xh;a) = Uh;f ; which in turn implies that Uh;a = z0 (xh;a) :
Solving this equation for the reserve price yields ra = 0; which means that the seller earns a =
 (xh;a) ; where  is given by (16). We can now compare prots. Observe that
 (xh;a) f = 1  z0(xh;a)  z1(xh;a)  f1  z0 ()gb
= z0 ()  z0(xh;a) + (  xh;a)z0(xh;a)
= z0(xh;a)fe q   1 + qg:
where q  xh;a : The second line follows from the fact that z0(xh;a) = Uh;f = f1 z0 ()g (1  b) =:
Note that xh;a <  since z0(xh;a) > z0 (); thus the expression in the third line is positive: It follows
that (xh;a) > f ; i.e. the deviating seller earns more; hence a E1 fails to exist if b <  ().
Per claims 3 and 4, if b# < b <  () then E1 and E3 fail to exist. E2 the separating equi-
librium characterized above is the unique competitive search equilibrium in this parameter region.
Similarly, if b#  b then E1 and E2 fail to exist. The only possible equilibrium is E3, where
all sellers adopt auctions. Lemma 4 characterizes this outcome: all sellers set a reserve price
ra = minfb; r^(xl;a)g and cater to both types of customers. Since all sellers adopt the same rule
and set the same reserve price we have xh;a = h and xl;a = l: What remains to be done is to
verify that if b#  b then no seller deviates from E3 by o¤ering xed pricing. If such a deviation
takes place then the deviating seller attracts low types only, and since b is too low, he posts rf = b:
Let xl;f denote his expected demand consisting of low types (note that xh;f = 0): Low types vis-
iting this store ought to be rewarded with the same expected utility they obtain along E3, that
is, Ul;f (b; 0; xl;f ) = Ul;a (ra; h; l) : Recall that the unique value of xl;f satisfying this relationship
is xl;f = x
#
l;f : We know that if b
#  b then f (b; 0; x#l;f )  a (ra; h; l) i.e. the deviating seller
cannot earn more.
If b   () then E2 and E3 fail to exist, but E1 is feasible. Since b   () the budget constraint
is slack, so E1 corresponds to the xed price equilibrium in the homogenous model (described in
Remark 1). Recall that along such an outcome all buyers earn the same market utility z0 () whereas
sellers earn the same expected prot  () :We need to verify that if b   () then no seller deviates
from E1 by switching to auctions. If such a deviation takes place then the deviating seller attracts
high types only (see the proof of Claim 4). Since potential customers are nancially unconstrained,
the solution of his problem is the same as the solution in the homogenous model: Letting xh;a denote
his expected demand, he provides his customers with z0 (xh;a) while he earns  (xh;a) : High type
buyers visiting this store ought to be rewarded with the same expected utility they obtain along E1,
that is z0 (xh;a) = z0 () ; which implies xh;a = : It follows that the deviating sellers expected prot
is  () ; which is the same as his expected prot along E1; hence there is no protable deviation.
This completes the proof. As an aside, note that in this parameter region one can provide all buyers
the same utility z0 () by instructing low types to shop at xed price stores and high types at
auction stores. However, such an outcome requires coordination among buyers on where to shop
when indi¤erent e.g. low types coordinate among themselves not to show up at an auction store,
even though they are indi¤erent. The xed price equilibrium in E1 requires no such coordination.
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